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NOTES
ANTITRUST AND THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY:
LESSONS FROM THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY
Since the landmark case of Silver v. New York Stock Exchange'
in 1963, the securities industry, the SEC, the Justice Department, and
the public have speculated on the impact that application of antitrust
principles might have on activities of the securities industry. Much
has been written on this subject, 2 but the effect has been noticeably
slight on both the SEC and the courts. Yet antitrust issues remain,
and the recent case of Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget
Svenska Amerika Linien3 (Swedish American) indicates that perhaps
the Supreme Court will require the regulatory agencies to consider
antitrust principles more fully in their determinations.
I
THE INTERPLAY OF AGENCY CONTROL AND
ANTITRUST PREMISES
Both antitrust laws4 and regulatory agency statutes represent a
congressional attempt to regulate the economy in the public interest
while promoting our basic economic theories. Although these two
types of regulation are often rationalized as being complementary,6
1 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
2 E.g., Johnson, Application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry, 20 Sw. L.J.
536 (1966); Sterling, Stockbrokers Going Public: Antitrust Aspects of Exchange Rules, 13
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 563 (1966); Note, Antitrust and the Stock Exchange: Minimum Com-
mission or Free Competition?, 18 STAN. L. REv. 213 (1965); Note, The Application of
Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry, 10 WrZr. & MARY L. REv. 136 (1968).
3 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
4 The basic antitrust legislation is found in three acts: the Sherman Antitrust Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1964); and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
5 Some of the more important regulated industries include:
a) Communications: Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1964);
b) Foreign shipping: Shipping Act of 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 801-42 (1964);
c) Power: Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1964);
d) Railroads, motor and water carriers: Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§
1-1022 (1964);
e) Securities: Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964).
G See, e.g., Northern Natural Gas. Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Judge
J. Skelly Wright stated that "the two forms of economic regulation complement each
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in reality they quite often meet in the courtroom in what Judge
Medina has characterized as a "head-on collision."7 This collision
occurs when an administrative agency takes anticompetitive action,
such as setting uniform rates or permitting a merger, to create im-
proved service in the regulated industry. Many such actions would
result in a per se violation of the antitrust laws were it not for the
regulatory statutes. Frequently a party injured by this action will
seek judicial relief in an antitrust proceeding. The court must then
decide which will be the appropriate tribunal for hearing the claims
of the aggrieved party: the court, the agency, or both; and if they are
to have concurrent jurisdiction, who will hear the claims first?8
The opposing positions on this issue are fairly well defined. Two
principal arguments support agency control: (1) greater uniformity
in the decisions if only one forum, the agency, hears the disputes; 9
and (2) expertise of the administrators in a narrow and technical
area.10 Contrariwise, supporting resort to judicial application of anti-
other." Id. The basis for this statement is that both antitrust laws and agency regulation
share the common purposes of: (1) the most efficient allocation of resources possible; and
(2) the stimulation of innovation for better service at a lower cost.
7 United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In this case the
Justice Department initiated antitrust proceedings against a number of stockbrokers. One
of the court's considerations was whether the dispute should be resolved in the courts
under antitrust principles or left to the discretion of the SEC. Judge Medina began his
inquiry into this issue in the following manner:
The plain truth of the matter is that the legal questions now under discussion
form an area of head-on collision between the SEC on the one hand and the
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice on the other.
Id.
8 If judge and administrator have concurrent jurisdiction, the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction may be applicable. This doctrine "requires judicial abstention in cases where
protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to the agency
which administers the scheme." United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S, 321,
353 (1963). The usual reasons given to justify prior administrative action are basically the
same as those justifying the use of antitrust exemptions: (1) expertise of the administrator
and (2) uniformity of result. For a discussion of this closely related doctrine of primary
jurisdiction see generally K. DAvis, ADMiNISrATIWE LAW TExT §§ 19.01-.09 (1959).
9 Uniformity was the first argument advanced and was cited in the case generally
thought to be the father of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 US. 426 (1907):
[If the power existed in both courts and the Commission to originally hear com-
plaints on this subject, there might be a divergence between the action of the
Commission and the decision of a court .... [T]hus a conflict would arise which
would render the enforcement of the act impossible.
Id. at 441.
10 See, e.g., United States Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932), where the
Court held that plaintiff must first go to the Shipping Board for determination because
of the complexity of the issue:
Their business involves questions of an exceptional character, the solution of
which may call for the exercise of a high degree of expert and technical knowl-
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trust principles is the contention that the competitive ideal should be
paramount, as competition achieves our desired goals of increasing
productivity and the total wealth of society." Furthermore, only
judges can be truly impartial, for regulatory agencies tend to lose
their reforming zeal and are even prone to become spokesmen for
those whom they regulate.12
Although these opposing views are debated in other situations, a
principal point of conflict concerns antitrust exemptions. The exemp-
tions represent an effort to accommodate the policies of antitrust and
regulatory agency control by creating immunities from antitrust suits's
in some areas of agency jurisdiction. 14 They may be created expressly
by statute,'15 by judicial decisions alone,'0 or impliedly in the regulatory
legislation. 7 In recent years antitrust advocates have been fairly
successful, for there has been a noticeable erosion in the antitrust
edge. Whether a given agreement among such carriers should be held to contra-
vene the act may depend upon a consideration of economic relations, of facts
peculiar to the business or its history, of competitive conditions in respect of the
shipping of foreign countries, and of other relevant circumstances, generally un-
familiar to a judicial tribunal, but well understood by an administrative body
especially trained and experienced in the intricate and technical facts and usages
of the shipping trade; and with which that body, consequently, is better able to
deal.
Id. at 485.
11 See Kestenbaum, Primary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: A Practical
Approach to the Allocation of Functions, 55 GEo. L.J. 812 (1967); Schwartz, Legal Restric-
tion of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility,
67 HARv. L. REv. 436 (1954).
12 See Huntington, The Marasmus of the I.C.C.: The Commission, The Railroads,
and The Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467 (1962). The author argues that the ICC has
lost its vitality because of increasing affiliation with the carriers it was supposed to be
regulating and in reality became a "defender of the status quo." Id. at 507. See also Note,
Regulated Industries and the Antitrust Laws: Substantive and Procedural Coordination,
58 COLuTm. L. REv. 673, 697 (1958).
18 An antitrust immunity is not the only reason that certain anticompetitive actions
and policies are permitted. In Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918), for example, the Board of Trade's "call" rule was upheld, since it
was justified under the rule of reason. Similarly, many of the exchange rules questioned
today might be upheld under this approach even if there were no antitrust immunities.
14 It is estimated that there are over 20 such exemptions. Pogue, The Rationale of
Exemptions from Antitrust, 19 ABA. ANrrrausr SECTION 313, 314 (1961). For a summary
of some of the more important exemptions see Antitrust Exemptions, 33 ABA. ANTrrRnr
LJ. 1 (1966-67).
15 E.g., agreements and conduct of ocean shipping conferences that have been ap-
proved by the Federal Maritime Commission, 46 U.S.C.A. § 814 (Supp. 1969); and certain
activities in the railroad industry, Reed-Bullwinkle Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) (1964).
16 E.g., professional baseball. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200
(1922).
17 An implied statutory exemption existed in the securities industry until Silver v.
New York Stock Exchange, 373 US. 341 (1963).,This case destroyed the complete immunity,
but an implied partial immunity still exists to a yet undetermined extent.
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exemptions and previously immune industries are now challenged in
the courts.18
II
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
A. The Statutory System
Long before the SEC was created, exchanges policed themselves.
The New York Stock Exchange, for example, was regulated by its
Constitution and Rules of the Board of Governors. 9 Today, under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,20 the exchanges continue to be
largely self-regulated,21 and the SEC has the unique status of "super-
visor of 'self'-regulators. ' '22 This supervisory position is designed to
permit review of exchange practices to assure that the exchanges ex-
ercise their delegated powers in the public interest.23
Unfortunately, the two statutory provisions enabling the SEC to
control the exchanges are not well adapted to solving the disputes
that have arisen concerning anticompetitive exchange practices. Sec-
tion 6,24 which requires an exchange to register, provides that the
rules of the exchange must be "just and adequate to insure fair deal-
ing and to protect investors." 25 Conceivably, this section could be
interpreted as a requirement that antitrust criteria be considered when
the rules are formulated. However, the sanction, revocation of regis-
18 The exemptions have lost their vitality in such diverse fields as:
a) organized labor: Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381
US. 676 (1965); U.M.W. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965);
b) insurance: United States v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 242 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Ill.
1965);
c) banking: United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963);
d) natural gas: United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964);
e) securities: Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
See generally Orrick, The Recent Erosion of Certain Antitrust Exemptions, 10 ANTIrrusr
BuLL. 667 (1965).
19 See, e.g., 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GUmE.
20 15 U.S.C. § 78a-hh (1964).
21 The purpose of the self-regulation provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
was to delegate governmental power to working institutions which would under-
take, at their own initiative, to enforce compliance with ethical as well as legal
standards in a complex and changing industry.
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 371 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
22 SEC, SPEcIAL STUDy OF SECURITMs MARzmIs pt. IV, at 501 (1963) [hereinafter cited
as SPEcLAL STmY].
28 Id. at 723.
24 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1964).
25 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1964).
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tration,2s for non-compliance with section 6 is a means of enforcement
too potent and inflexible to foster active SEC regulation in the area
of antitrust. Section 19(b)27 provides a potentially more flexible ap-
proach to antitrust control. It gives the SEC the power to change
existing exchange rules if
such changes are necessary or appropriate for the protection of in-
vestors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded in upon such
exchange or to insure fair administration of such exchange... 28
Section 19(b) appears to confer broad regulatory powers upon the
SEC, but historically it has been a weak section.29 Perhaps its underly-
ing weakness is that the standard of "fair administration" has not been
defined by case law. In particular, it is unclear whether this standard
authorizes the SEC to apply antitrust concepts in deciding if a rule
should be changed. The one case80 decided by the SEC under section
19(b) involved a NYSE rule regarding the expulsion of members and
non-members. In interpreting "fair administration" and ordering an
alteration of the rule, the SEC clearly considered antitrust principles.8 '
Since this 1941 decision, however, antitrust principles apparently have
not been a significant factor in SEC decisions.3 2
The SEC is far from taking the lead in resolving disputes raising
antitrust issues. In large part this is the fault of the statute. First,
section 19(b) is couched in permissive language and neither compels
the SEC to look at exchange rules as a matter of course nor sets out
definite criteria to be used in examining rules. This deficiency is
probably responsible for the dearth of proceedings expressly involving
antitrust principles. Second, the Commission does not have authority
to change rules across the board but is limited to specified areas. 38
26 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (1964).
27 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1964).
28 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
29 2 L. Loss, SEcuPrrEs REGULATION 1182 (1961).
80 The Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270 (1941).
81 It seems to us, therefore, that the Rule would operate as an unreasonable and
unjustified restraint upon interstate commerce and that enforcement of the Rule
would violate one of the basic purposes of regulation under the Act, a purpose
which is closely related to the public policy regarding unreasonable restraints and
the maintenance of fair competition as declared by Congress in the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act.
Id. at 287.
82 Recently, and probably as a result of the Silver decision, the SEC again raised the
antitrust factor by declaring that "antitrust considerations should receive the closest
scrutiny." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239, at 2 (Jan. 26, 1968).
88 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964). There are thirteen areas where the SEC may change or
alter exchange rules, the last of which is "similar matters." Whether this provision could
be defined as including all exchange rules is doubtful, for the statutory listing of specified
areas of authority could be interpreted as an intent to limit the areas of SEC intervention.
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Third, the SEC is not required to examine exchange rules in advance
of their taking effect, and the Commission has not assumed affirmative
power to approve or disapprove all rules. 34 Finally, no statutory anti-
trust exemption clearly delineates the balance of jurisdiction between
the Commission and the courts concerning possible antitrust viola-
tions. Nevertheless, people are injured by exchange practices, and
some forum should exist to consider antitrust charges.
B. Antitrust and the Courts
Among specific exchange practices that clearly raise antitrust
questions are minimum commission rates;3 5 rules formulated to restrict
multiple trading in listed securities; 36 restrictive exchange membership
requirements that tend to control entry into the market; 7 and even
proposals for eliminating the paperwork backlogs currently plaguing
brokerage houses.3 8 Not surprisingly, commentators and aggrieved
parties have attacked exchange practices and demanded that some
tribunal be made available for examining the anticompetitive practices
of the exchanges. 89
Until 1963, however, persons raising antitrust issues were without
a forum. The SEC, either because of timidity40 or a belief that section
34 In United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Products, Inc., [1961-1964 Transfer Binder] CCH
FEn. SEc. L. REP. 91,288 (Md. Baltimore City Cir. Ct. 1963), the court stated at 94,284
that "(s]ection 19(b) of the Securities Exchange Act gives the S.E.C. full authority and
power to approve or disapprove changes in the rules of a registered exchange." However,
the statute does not expressly grant such power to the SEC and the Commission itself has
never assumed the role of approving or disapproving rules or rules changes before they
have been given effect.
35 N.Y.S.E. CoNsT. art. XV, in 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. Gum 1701-12. Several commentators
have selected the minimum commission rate structure for particular criticism. See, e.g.,
Note, Antitrust and the Stock Exchange: Minimum Commission or Free Competition?, 18
STAN. L. R v. 213 (1965).
The Justice Department, in a recent memorandum to the SEC, has recommended that
the minimum commission schedule be abolished within five years and replaced with open
competition among brokers to determine rates. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1969, at 1, col. 7 (city
ed.).
The plight of the institutional investor has received a good deal of comment, and in
response, Congress has authorized the SEC to undertake a study of the problems of the
institutional investor. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78s(e) (Supp. 1969). Perhaps this study will result in
rules changes regarding the rate structure of commissions.
36 E.g., N.YS.E. Rule 394, in 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GumE 2394.
37 N.Y.S.E. CoNsr. art. IX, in 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GuiDE 1401-15; N.Y.S.E. Rules 301-21,
in 2 CCH N.Y.S.E. GuiDE 2301-21.
38 Note, The Back Office Problem and the Antitrust Laws, 69 CoLubr. L. R-v. 299
(1969).
39 See generally sources cited in note 2 supea.
40 The SEC is not immune to the lethargy that can affect any administrative agency.
A past Chairman of the SEC has stressed the need for continual re-examination of the
agency's goals:
1969]
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19(b) was inapplicable or inappropriate, did not consider these prob-
lems. The courts created an implied antitrust exemption that forbade
their hearing antitrust suits in the securities industry. Wishing to
avoid a clash with the SEC, courts interpreted section 19(b) as re-
serving jurisdiction in that agency and withdrew from activity in this
area.
41
This mutual abdication could last only until a particularly harsh
case forced one of the forums to grant relief. Influenced perhaps by
the gradual erosion in antitrust exemptions, the courts yielded first,
in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange.42 Silver, a non-member broker,
had direct wire connections to a member firm for receiving over-the-
counter quotations. Under a rule of the New York Stock Exchange
the wires were ordered removed. Silver was given neither notice nor
an opportunity for a hearing on this decision which greatly reduced
his business. In an antitrust suit against the exchange, the Supreme
Court ruled that the implied antitrust exemption extended to those
rules that were within the jurisdiction of the SEC, but that the issue
before the Court involved an "interpretation" of a rule rather than
the rule itself. The Court then held that interpretation was outside
the SEC's jurisdiction and, by this rather technical holding, granted
relief to Silver.
Other aggrieved investors and brokers, heartened by the outcome
in Silver, initiated antitrust suits involving various exchange rules
and practices, 43 but their enthusiasm proved to be premature. Courts
I firmly believe that any institution-private or public--can be run honestly and
tirelessly and yet at the same time it can die. Rigor mortis will set in if all of
us do not reexamine ourselves, find out where the industry has been moving, and
accordingly re-define our responsibilities.
Gary, Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry, 49 A.B.AJ. 244 (1963).
41 Of course there were views to the contrary. In United States v. Morgan, 118 F.
Supp. 621, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), Judge Medina argued that congressmen were aware of
antitrust principles when the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was enacted and that "they
intended no exemption to the Sherman Act; and it is hardly probable that they would
inadvertently accomplish such a result."
42 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
43 In Cowen v. New York Stock Exchange, 371 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1967), an employee
of a member firm of the exchange was discharged for being involved in a tainted trans-
action. He brought an antitrust suit against the exchange on the ground of procedural
unfairness in its failure to give him a hearing. Unlike Silver, the plaintiff had been given
notice of the charges against him and the reasons for his dismissal; the suit was dismissed.
Thill Securities Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH
FED. SEC. L. RP. 92,189 (EJ). Wis. 1968), involved more than the procedural questions
of Silver and Cowen. Plaintiff, a non-member firm, brQught an antitrust suit against the
exchange after being denied access to the trading floor under the rules of the exchange.
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subsequently have limited the holding in Silver to its facts, to cir-
cumstances of extreme unfairness resulting from the denial of pro-
cedural safeguards. These plaintiffs' lack of success indicates the
continued reluctance of courts to permit direct antitrust suits in the
securities industry.
Undoubtedly the most significant post-Silver case is Kaplan v.
Lehman Brothers.44 Kaplan raised the highly controversial question
of an exchange's power to set minimum commission rates for its mem-
ber brokers, as the NYSE has been doing since its founding under the
Buttonwood Tree Agreement in 1792.45 For round lot transactions,
brokers are required to charge the same per-share rate regardless of
the number of shares involved; it therefore costs ten times as much to
trade 1,000 shares as it does to trade 100 shares, even though the costs
of making these transactions are not appreciably different.46 Plaintiffs
in Kaplan, who carried out large transactions, alleged that the min-
imum commission requirement violated the antitrust laws, since if
competition were permitted among brokers their brokers' fees would
have been eleven percent less.47
Their case rested on section 19(b)(9) of the Exchange Act, which
gives the SEC power to alter exchange rules dealing with the "fixing
of reasonable rates of commission." Focusing on the word "reason-
able," plaintiffs claimed that the minimum commission rates were un-
reasonable since the costs involved were not dependent upon the size
of the transaction although the commissions were. The court refused
to rule on the reasonableness issue, holding that, since section 19(b)
The real basis for this case is an attack on the limited membership of the NYSE. With
only 1,266 natural persons allowed a seat, and the corresponding privilege of trading on
the exchange, many thousands of brokerage firms are excluded by the high cost of buying
one seat. This case has yet to be decided on the merits because of a venue challenge; how-
ever, the Silver rationale seems to bar any recovery. At least implicitly, the SEC has juris-
diction under § 19(b)(5) or the catch-all provision of § 19(b)(13), and there is thus an
implied exemption from the antitrust statutes.
44 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 954 (1967).
46 B. SHuLTz, ThE SECURrrI s MARKnT-AND How IT WoanS 2 (1963). The SPEcuL
STuo', pt. 2, at 295 states:
The avowed objectives of organizing the NYSE in 1792 were the setting of
minimum commission rates and the establishment of a preference for members
of the Exchange in their dealings with other members
46 SPECIAL STUny, pt. 2, at 320.
47 It is clear that but for the 1934 Act, the agreement to fix the prices of brokerage
commissions would be a per se violation of antitrust laws. United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Bds., 39 U.S. 485, 489 (1950); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150, 218 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-98 (1927).
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
confers jurisdiction over exchange rates on the SEC, the antitrust
exemption denied the court power to hear the case.48
The real injustice in a case such as Kaplan is not its failure- to
strike down minimum commission rates49 or other exchange practices,
but its failure to provide a forum in which grievances can be aired.
The Kaplan court refused jurisdiction on the unwarranted assumption
that the SEC would act on antitrust problems. But even if the Com-
mission does not act, its jurisdiction over such problems brings the
antitrust exemption into play and bars judicial relief.50 The Silver
Court is the only court that has heard the merits of an antitrust griev-
ance, and the SEC has heard only one proceeding under section 19(b).
Present inaction is intolerable; fairness demands that some forum
listen to and decide cases where genuine antitrust grievances are
raised. Recent cases in the shipping industry suggest a method by
which the securities exchanges might be more effectively regulated
in antitrust matters.
III
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES IN THE SHIPPING INDUSTRYS"
Despite distinct differenrces in subject matter, the securities and
shipping industries are strikingly similar in the manner of their reg-
ulation. Each industry was self-regulated before its respective regula-
tory agency was created, and each has remained, through statutory
48 A similar result was achieved under the Investment Company Act of 1940 in a suit
premised on a Kobinson-Patman Act violation. The court in Baum v. Investors Diversified
Services, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 914 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff'd, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,405 (7th
Cir. Apr. 18, 1969), held that an antitrust exemption existed because of SEC jurisdiction
under § 22 of the Investment Company Act.
49 An effective challenge to minimum commission practices may be forthcoming
shortly. The Justice Department has taken a position in favor of competitive rates on the
ground that the present rate structure, "by sheltering firms from competition, leads to
inefficiency, and high costs, and may have contributed to the serious clearing problems in
the brokerage industry." CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,658, at 83,440.
50 The [Kaplan] court.. . did not cite a single instance where the S.E.C. exercised
its § 19(b) powers over rates, for the simple reason that the S.E.C. never has. The
dangerous precedent established is that unused regulatory power, power guided
by no clearly delineated competitive standard and direction, constitutes regulatory
pervasiveness sufficient to invoke an antitrust immunity. If S.E.C. rate power is
pervasive, the S.E.C. seems unconcerned about it. After 33 years and the NYSE's
adoption of five rate increases (at minimum rates), the S.E.C. has never convened
a rate hearing or instituted a formal rate investigation ....
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 36, Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 389 U.S. 954 (1967).
81 For a broad discussion of this general topic see Comment, Accommodations of
Antitrust Law and Ocean Shipping Regulation, 4 TExAs IT . L.F. 393 (1968).
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design, a primarily self-regulated industry despite the presence of a
regulatory agency.52
Self-regulation in the shipping industry is accomplished thl'ough
the conference system. The conference is an organization of steamship
lines that controls shipping rates and practices in one trade route;
that is, from one geographical point to another.5 3 Conferences were
developed in the late nineteenth century when an excess of cargo
space caused cut-throat price competition that jeopardized the sur-
vival of many lines. The conferences' pricefixing practices were clearly
anticompetitive but, as a practical matter, were necessary to stabilize
chaotic conditions and were essential to the continued existence of
many steamship lines.
In 1916 Congress enacted the Shipping Act 54 to regulate the
industry and decided to retain the conferences as a part of the statu-
tory scheme. Under the Act, however, the conferences are required
to submit any agreements to the Federal Maritime Commission for
approval before they become effective. 5  The FMC has the power to
approve or "disapprove, cancel or modify any agreement,"5 6 according
to statutory standards. Unlike the Securities Exchange Act, which is
silent as to antitrust exemptions, the Shipping Act expressly exempts
from the antitrust laws those agreements approved by the FMC.57
For a number of years antitrust problems in the shipping industry
were treated in the same way as similar problems are currently treated
in the securities industry. If the regulatory agency had jurisdiction,
the courts would not entertain the suit, regardless of whether the
agency actually acted on the matter. Early case law extended the
statutory antitrust exemption by bringing within its protection un-
approved agreements as well as those specifically approved by the FMC.
52 The principal objection to such an analogy is that antitrust exemptions result from
historical developments within each specific industry. The exemptions were created to
meet the specific problems of each area and neither the statutes nor the case law has at-
tempted to draw binding precedents from one area to another.
A reading of the cases will indicate that most judges treat each area quite distinctly.
Justice Goldberg, for example, wrote the majority opinion in Silver that permitted anti-
trust suits in the securities industry for the first time and yet vigorously dissented when
the Court reopened the path to antitrust litigation in organized labor. Local 189, Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 US. 676, 697 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
53 For an excellent discussion of the conference system and its ratemaking function
see Note, Rate Regulation in Ocean Shipping, 78 HAxv. L. REy. 635 (1965).
M 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1964).
55 46 US.C.A. § 814 (Supp. 1969).
56 Id.
57 Id.
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
In United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 8 for ex-
ample, a private antitrust suit was brought on the theory that a dual-
rate agreement had not been approved by the Shipping Board (pre-
decessor to the FMC). The Court dismissed the suit on the ground
that the controversy was within the jurisdiction of the Shipping
Board.
The courts, however, gradually began to look differently at the
administrative agency's role in the shipping industry. Although in
1952 the Supreme Court was still deferring to the agency under the
familiar reasons of uniformity and expertise,5 9 in 1954 the courts
began to pressure the FMC into taking a more active role. In Is-
brandtsen Co. v. United States6" the District of Columbia Circuit
required the agency to hold a hearing on, and approve, conference
agreements before the agreements became effective; this decision effec-
tively eliminated the situation in which an agency's failure to act
could create an antitrust immunity. The court used language that
could be appropriately applied to the securities industry:
This pre-approval illegality [of conference rules] stems from the
fact that the Shipping Act specifically provides machinery for
legalizing that which would otherwise be illegal under the anti-
trust laws. The condition upon which such authority is granted
is that the agency entrusted with the duty to protect the public in-
terest scrutinize the agreement to make sure that the conduct thus
legalized does not invade the prohibitions of the anti-trust laws
any more than is necessary to serve the purposes of the regulatory
statute. 61
Even greater pressure was put on the agency by the Supreme Court
in Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen Co. 62 Here the Board had
authorized a dual-rate system by a conference, but this approval not-
withstanding, the Court overruled the agency. This decision has been
credited with making the agency more aggressive and receptive to
antitrust principles when considering the actions and proposals of
the conferences.63
Recent developments have increased the pressure to assure that
competition plays as great a role as possible in the shipping industry.
58 284 U.S. 474 (1932). This case had been followed by other cases in the shipping
industry, including Far East Conference v. United-States, 842 U.S. 570 (1952).
59 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
60 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 847 U.S. 990 (1954),
61 Id. at 57 (footnotes omitted).
62 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
68 Comment, Ocean Shipping Conferences and the Federal Maritime Commission, 53
CoRNEm L. R.v. 1070, 1076 (1968).
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The antitrust exemption has been restricted to the rule expressly
formulated in the statute; i.e., only those agreements approved by the
FMC are exempt. In Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound ConferenceG4
the conference increased the shipping rates for evaporated milk with-
out seeking prior approval of the FMC, and Carnation brought an anti-
trust action. Under the Cunard decision, the traditional defense of the
antitrust exemption would have been binding on the Court since
rate changes are clearly within the jurisdiction of the FMC. The
Court, however, noted that only approved agreements fall within the
statutory exemption and held that "the implementation of rate-making
agreements which have not been approved by the Federal Maritime
Commission is subject to the antitrust laws."65
A second development is the formulation of the criteria the FMC
must consider when it approves or disapproves the rules and agree-
ments of a conference. If it is true that agencies tend to be spokesmen
for the regulated industries, a want of standards creates the danger
that agency approval is a ritual that broadens the antitrust immunity
without considering the public interest. A 1961 amendment added to
the existihg standards of the Shipping Act a requirement that con-
ference rules be disapproved if "contrary to the public interest." 66
Since this public interest standard had been interpreted in other
regulatory statutes as requiring the agency to investigate antitrust
principles, 67 it opened the way for a new approach in examining
conference agreements.
The first test of this standard under the Shipping Act came in
Federal Maritime Commission v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien
(Swedish American),6 8 where a conference adopted two rules that
clearly would have violated the antitrust laws were it not for the
regulatory statute.6 9 The FMC refused to approve these rules under
the public interest standard "because the anticompetitive activity
under the agreement invades the prohibitions of the antitrust laws
more than is necessary to serve the purposes of the Shipping Act and
64 383 U.S. 218, modified, 883 U.S. 982 (1966).
85 Id. at 216.
66 46 U.S.CA. § 814 (Supp. 1969).
67 See California v. FPC, 869 U.S. 482, 484-85 (1962); United States v. R.C.A., 858 U.S.
84, 851 (1959).
68 890 U.S. 288 (1968).
69 The first was a "tying" rule of the conferences prohibiting agents who sold tickets
on conference lines from selling tickets on competing nonconference lines. The second was
the "unanimity" rule, which required unanimous action by conference members before
the maximum commission rates of travel agents could be changed. Id. at 240.
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is therefore contrary to the public interest." 70 Before the Supreme
Court, the conference argued that making antitrust principles one of
the standards for disapproval would, in effect, repeal the statutory
exemptions. The Court held, however, that antitrust principles
were an appropriate concern of the FMC. The Court reasoned that
some anticompetitive agreements would be justifiable and thus give
meaning to the exemption. 71
This method of infusing antitrust principles into the regulatory
framework of the shipping industry is a sound approach. Since the
conferences initiate all rules and agreements, the desired self-regula-
tory scheme is preserved. By requiring the agency to give prior approval
to all rules and to consider antitrust principles, the desired application
of these principles is achieved. A potential plaintiff is thus assured
that at least one forum has examined the antitrust ramifications of
proposed industry practices. Finally, limiting the statutory exemption
to approved agreements permits antitrust litigation by aggrieved
parties in all other situations.72
IV
FUTURE ANTITRUST DRCTIONS IN THE SECURITES INDUSTRY
Even before Swedish American there were indications that changes
would be forthcoming in the application of antitrust principles to the
securities industry. The New York Stock Exchange recognized that
SEC regulation is "an important bulwark of our antitrust immu-
70 Investigation of Passenger Steamship Conferences Regarding Travel Agents, 10
F.M.C. 27, 35 (1966) (footnote omitted).
71 390 U.S. at 245. The technique of requiring regulatory agencies to take account of
antitrust principles is not entirely unique. See, e.g., McLean Trucking Co. v. United
States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944), where the Court sustained an ICC-approved merger as in the
public interest because substantial economies justified and offset the anticompetitive as-
pects of the merger.
72 See, e.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Plaintiff brought an antitrust suit alleging that he was driven out of
business by low rates that were fixed by a conference and later raised after he had gone
out of business. The conference agreement on the low rates was filed with the FMC and
allowed to go into effect upon the filing even though the FMC had not taken action either
to approve or disapprove the rates. The defendant conferences moved to dismiss the suit
on the grounds of the antitrust exemption. The court, however, citing both Carnation
and Swedish American, held that the conferences were not immune from antitrust litiga-
tion until the conference agreements were actually approved by the FMC. Since this agree-
ment was not approved, the suit was not dismissed.
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nity."73 and the SEC itself was careful at least to pay lip service to the
antitrust implications of its work.74 Moreover, a judicial concern with
the crudeness of implied antitrust exemptions was apparent. Courts
noted that such exemptions are "strongly disfavored."7 5 The Swedish
American decision indicates that a court hearing Kaplan v. Lehman
Brothers today might not consider itself without jurisdiction; an in-
stitutional argument based on the lack of antitrust considerations by
any forum would be a timely alternative to the argument of reason-
ableness made in Kaplan. It is significant in this regard that Chief Jus-
tice Warren, in his dissent to the Court's denial of certiorari in Kap-
lan,76 protested vigorously against the judiciary's "blunderbuss ap-
proach"7 7 of using section 19(b) to create an antitrust immunity.
Arguably the implied antitrust exemption of the securities in-
dustry could be totally removed and the courts opened to antitrust
suits in which such disputes could be resolved.78 This suggestion, made
by the Justice Department during the minimum commission rate
controversy,79 is not sound, however. Without some type of antitrust
exemption, the exchanges would be in a continual state of uncertainty
as to what acts they could undertake. Furthermore, private antitrust
73 We hear it said that this intrusion on profitability was none of our business,
neither the Stock Exchange's business nor the SEC's. But I take a contrary view.
I submit it was not only a concern and responsibility of the NYSE, but that over-
sight review by the SEC is mandated by the 1934 Act. It comprises an important
bulwark of our anti-trust immunity.
CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77,667, at 83,463 (Remarks of Robert W. Haack, President of the
NYSE, Jan. 22, 1969).
74 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968):
This necessarily contemplates that full consideration be given to the policies of
the antitrust laws .... [I]t is dear that antitrust considerations should receive
the closest scrutiny.
Id. at 2.
75 "Repeals of the antitrust laws by implication from a regulatory statute are strongly
disfavored." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963).
76 See text accompanying notes 44-51 supra.
77 Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., cert. denied, 389 US. 954, 957 (1967) (Warren, C. J., dis-
senting).
78 It is not dear that removing the exemptions would actually open the courts, since
the courts might resort to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to achieve the same results
as those presently reached under the antitrust exemptions.
79 The conclusion which emerges from the record of this proceeding is that the
system of fixed minimum commissions is not justified or needed "to make the
Securities Exchange Act work." Indeed, the present system has produced serious
detriments by fragmenting the market and leading to undesirable practices and
market restrictions. As a consequence, not only are the antitrust laws applicable,
but the objectives of the Exchange Act also are inconsistent with the present rate
structure.
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,658, at 83,442.
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suits could easily be used to circumvent the SEC and might so under-
mine the Commission that it would cease to be an effective regulator.
Finally, the courts are ill-equipped to handle technical securities in-
dustry matters,8 0 and they would be plagued with too many "garden-
variety customer-broker suits." 8' The SEC is better equipped than the
courts in both expertise and staff to fully investigate antitrust issues.
It is the appropriate forum to handle antitrust disputes,8 2 and the
exemptions, therefore, should not be removed.8 3
However, because Swedish American suggests that the Kaplan
decision is vulnerable, it is incumbent on the SEC to act decisively
in considering antitrust principles before the courts permit more
comprehensive application of the antitrust laws to the securities in-
dustry. The shipping industry provides a good model. No sweeping
revision of the existing statutory framework is required. The basic
self-regulatory scheme is sound, since it is desirable that the industry's
rules be proposed by the exchanges themselves.84 The two changes
that are necessary if the SEC is to give real content to antitrust prin-
ciples are in approach rather than in organization and must parallel the
developments in the shipping industry: the courts must take a more
active role in overseeing the SEC's activities, and the SEC itself must
take more initiative in applying antitrust principles.
The courts' role must be to assure that antitrust principles are
given genuine consideration. It should no longer be sufficient for the
courts merely to look for potential SEC jurisdiction under section
19(b) and, upon finding it, disqualify themselves on the ground of an
80 As the district court stated in Kaplan, "Ratemaking is a matter for which the
courts are ill-equipped, and accordingly a matter traditionally committed to an admin-
istrative agency." 250 F. Supp. at 566.
81 Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir. 1966).
82 This is the conclusion of the SPECIAL STUDY, pt. IV, at 724:
It is the belief of the Special Study that if self-regulation is to function effectively
and with due regard for all aspects of the public interest, including the interest in
vigorous self-regulation, the forum for review of self-regulatory action should be
the agency already established as the official, expert guardian of the public interest
in the field of securities; i.e., the Commission.
88 Neither should the securities industry be given a blanket antitrust immunity as has
been proposed. Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 1965, at 1, col. 6. To do so would free the Commission
from all scrutiny, whereas past experience indicates that agencies promote the public in-
terest more effectively if under some form of supervision.
84 The SPECIAL STUDY generally endorses the self-regulation framework and recom-
mends that it be retained:
[T]he basic statutory design of substantial reliance on industry self-regulation ap-
pears to have stood the test of time and to have worked effectively in most areas.
In other words, the study has concluded that the demonstrated strengths and
benefits of self-regulation outweigh its disclosed inadequacies ...
SPECIAL STUpY, pt. IV, at 504.
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antitrust exemption. In the shipping industry the courts filled this
role by requiring the agency to hold hearings and give specific approval
of rules,85 overruling agency decisions that failed to follow certain
standards,88 refusing to grant antitrust immunity to unapproved
rules,87 and affirming that the content of the agency's investigation
included consideration of antitrust principles.88 Courts should now
take similar steps to achieve this desired infusion of antitrust principles
into securities industry regulation.
As the Swedish American decision indicates, however, the major
burden of applying antitrust principles must fall primarily on the
regulatory agency. The SEC lacks the well-defined grant of authority
that the Shipping Act's standard of "public interest" gives to the
FMC. However, section 19(b) of the Exchange Act contains a standard
of "fair administration" that is sufficiently broad to permit the for-
mulation of antitrust principles. 89 The SEC has recently recognized
an obligation to apply antitrust principles. 90 Unfortunately, to date
there have been no sweeping changes in SEC proceedings to assure
significantly greater regulation of the exchanges under section 19(b).
Of course, the legal underpinnings are to no avail unless the courts
require changes or SEC personnel themselves decide to adopt a more
aggressive posture. Certainly the new-found powers of the FMC in
applying antitrust principles have been to a large degree a result of
"more dynamic leadership." 91
85 Isbrandtsen v. United States, 211 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 990
(1954).
86 Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958).
87 Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, modified, 383 U.S.
932 (1966).
88 Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Linien (Swedish Amer-
ican), 390 U.S. 238 (1968).
89 Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 H~Av.
L. R . 1207, 1234, 1238 (1969). The author suggests that the language of regulatory
statutes is sufficiently broad to permit an aggressive agency to take an active role in
innovation and control.
90 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968).
Manuel Cohen, the past Chairman of the SEC, expressed a desire to have the SEC,
not the courts, take prime responsibility in the antitrust area:
We firmly believe that in matters like . . . commission rates that the Com-
mission with its responsibility and concern for these matters is in the best position
to comprehend and reconcile the diverse factors and considerations that may bear
upon the public interest in the manifold circumstances under which questions
may arise. Ad hoc determinations in the antitrust courts of complex matters such
as these could have. an undesirable impact upon the quality of the markets and
the interests of the investing public.
111 CONG. REc. 19022 (1965).
91 Comment, Ocean Shipping Conferences and the Federal Maritime Commission, 53
CORNELL L. RaY. 1070, 1076 (1968).
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If the SEC is to meet the standards of Swedish American and
use its regulatory powers with antitrust considerations in -mind, several
new approaches will be required. Under its broad mandate to regulate
to assure the "fair administration" of exchanges, 92 the Commission
should assume the power to approve or disapprove proposed rules and
should require, as does the FMC, that all new rules and modifications
of rules be submitted in advance for its consideration. Using the
power given by section 19(b) to alter existing rules, it should also
periodically re-examine old rules. In both situations open hearings
should be held. As in Swedish American, the agency should make an
initial determination of whether, in the absence of the statute, the
rule would violate antitrust principles. If so, the rule should be dis-
approved unless the exchange meets its burden of justification.9 3 A
rule that is not approved should not be protected under the antitrust
exemption. An approved rule, however, should be immune to direct
attack in the courts.
The SEC has much to gain by taking the initiative in regulating
antitrust matters in the securities industry. Such action is likely to
decrease the possibility of expanded judicial activity in securities
regulation. More important, investors and brokers who feel they have
been damaged by industry practices will be assured of a forum that
will hear the merits of their grievances.
Robert W. Wild
In the SEC there has been a recent change of leadership as Hamer H. Budge replaced
Manuel F. Cohen as Chairman in February 1969. CCH FED. SEc. L. Ra,. Current Vol.,
Law Report Letter No. 243 (Feb. 26, 1969).
92 There is apparently no question about the SEC's power under § 19(b) to approve
or disapprove proposed rules. See, e.g., United Funds, Inc. v. Carter Products, Inc., [1961-
1964 Transfer Binder] CCH Fan. SEc. L. REn. 91,288, at 94,284 (Md. Baltimore City Cir.
Ct. 1963).
93 The broad standard of Silver might be considered:
[E]xchange self-regulation is to be regarded as justified in response to antitrust
charges only to the extent necessary to protect the achievement of the aims of the
Securities Exchange Act.
373 U.S. at 361.
